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LEGISLATION
Compositions and Extensions Under the Chandler Act
The Bankruptcy Act of 18981 included provisions for a composition
between a debtor and his creditor, but Section 12, in which these provi-
sions were found never proved to be particularly popular due to its cum-
bersome and slow proceedings.2 In 1933 the Act was amended by the
I. 30 STAT. 544 (1898), ii U. S. C. A. I et seq. (927).
2. Weinstein, The Debtor Relief Chapters of the Chandler Act (938) 5 Pirrs. L.
REv. 1, 14; Mulder and Solomon, Effect of the Chandler Act on General Assignments
and Compositions (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 763, 787.
(837)
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addition of Section 74 3 which was designed to speed up comp6sition pro-
ceedings and meet some of the procedural and substantive difficulties
present under Section 12 and also to provide for an extension of secured
claims as well as a composition of unsecured claims.4 Unfortunately,
however, many ambiguities were present in Section 74.5 These led to
litigation which delayed the proceedings considerably and led to a re-
luctance on the part of debtors to avail themselves of the section. The
presence of both Sections 74 and 12 necessarily caused some conflict
which merely increased the confusion. 6 The new Chandler Act 7 is an
attempt to clarify this complicated situation and provide an adequate
method for the debtor to obtain relief. There are two new Chapters, XI
and XII, designed expressly to replace Sections 12 and 74, and to simplify
and speed up the procedure and at the same time to provide an inexpensive
and attractive method for the debtor to rehabilitate himself. With this
aim in mind many changes have been made from the old Sections 12 and
74, making it worthwhile to examine the more important innovations to
see if an adequate replacement for the common-law composition and
statutory assignment has at last been found.
WHO MAY EFFECT AN ARRANGEMENT s
In proceedings under Chapter XI it is possible for any debtor who
might become a bankrupt under the general terms of the Act 0 to effect
an arrangement with his creditors as to his unsecured debts only.' 0 Cor-
porations may avail themselves of this Chapter," but have been forbidden
the use of Chapter XII,12 dealing with arrangements concerning secured
as well as unsecured debts and providing for an extension or a scaling
down of these debts. The primary reason for this is that Chapter X,
which has replaced Section 77B, provides an adequate solution for cor-
porate financial problems in relation to secured debts in that it provides
for reorganization which is not contemplated by Chapter XII. Apparently
it was felt that in the case of unsecured debts there would be no need
3. 47 STAT. 1467 (1933), II U. S. C. A. 201 (1937).
4. § 12 had dealt only with unsecured claims.
5. For extended analysis and criticism of § 74 see Garrison, The New Bankruptcy
Amendments: Some Problems of Construction (1933) 8 Wis. L. REV. 291; Hanna,
Recent Additions to the Bankruptcy Act (933) I GEo. WASHINGTON L. REv. 448;
Kinnane, Some Aspects of Section 74 of the Bankruptcy Act (934) 9 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 291; Mulder and Solomon, Effect of the Chandler Act Upon General Assign-
ments and Compositions (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 763; Notes (1933) 33 COL. L.
REv. 704; (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1285.
6. See Mulder and Solomon, supra note 5, at 788.
7. 52 STAT. 840, 11 U. S. C. A. I et seq. (Supp. 1938). For a survey of the various
aspects of the Chandler Act see Wilde, The Chandler Act (1938) 14 INDIANA L. J. 93;
Levi, Corporate Reorganization (1938) 23 MINN. L. REv. I; Gerdes, Corporate Reor-
ganizations: Changes Effected by Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act (1938) 52 HARV.
L. REv. I; Heuston, Corporate Reorganizations under the Chandler Act (1938) 38 COL.
L. R v. ii9; Note (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 105. See also Notes (937) 23 VA.
L. REv. 74; 46 YALE L. J. 1177, 1181, both of which were written prior to the passing
of the Act. For a detailed discussion and comparative analysis of the new act see
WEINSTEIN, THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF 1938 (1938).
8. As will be explained infra "arrangement" is the term now used in-the place of
"composition" and "extension".
9. § 3o6 (3).
10. § 306 (I).
II. §§ 4 (a), 146 (2), unlike Section 74 of the old Act which expressly excluded
them from its scope (§ 74 (a) ; In re Collins, 75 F. (2d) 62 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934) ) thus
forcing them either to come under Section 77B or the antiquated provisions of Sec-
tion 12.
12. § 406 (6).
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in many cases for corporations to go through the extensive formalities of
reorganization; hence Chapter XI was made available in that situation.
However, in this connection several problems are posed by the Act. While
it has been assumed supra that a corporation will not attempt to affect a
reorganization under Chapter XI, that possibility is not precluded by the
Chapter which might be interpreted as providing a method of reorganiza-
tion. Chapter XI makes no provision for stockholders of the corporation
and their status is open to some doubt. 8 Settlement of this problem by
litigation will result in delay and expense.
Under both Chapters XI and XII, as under the Act of 1898,14 the
proceedings are voluntary only.' 5 It would be illogical to have involun-
tary petitions under these chapters, for the debtor may desire to liquidate
the business in straight bankruptcy whereas an arrangement would con-
template its continuation. Thus an involuntary petition would be an
impossibility, since a debtor could not be forced to remain in business.
However, at least one subsidiary problem is raised by the voluntary nature
of the proceedings. Under Chapter X a petition on the part of the cred-
itors is deemed not to be filed in good faith if adequate relief could be
obtained by a debtor's petition under Chapter XI.' 6  Quaere whether if
the debtor refuses to bring a petition under Chapter XI this would be
sufficient to show that the creditor could not get adequate relief under
this Chapter? '7
WHEN AN ARRANGEMENT MAY BE AFFEcTED
Under both Chapters a debtor may file a petition when he is insolvent
in the equity sense,' 8 i. e., unable to pay his debts as they mature. Ac-
cordingly, he may file an involuntary petition at any time without waiting
for straight bankruptcy proceedings to be instituted. 9 This was likewise
true under Section 74,20 but under Section 12 only a bankrupt could offer
terms of composition. 21 Thus, a corporation wishing to affect a composition
could do so only after adjudication, since it could proceed only under
Section 12.22 In many cases this might be too late for rehabilitation. The
new Chapter XI is in accord with the trend toward rehabilitation rather
than liquidation.
13. See Mulder and Solomon, supra note 5, at 790.
14. See It re Brooks Sample Furniture Co., 4 F. Supp. 858, 859 (D. Conn. 1933).
i. XI, § 306 (5) ; XII, § 406 (9).
i6. § 146 (2).
17. See Heuston, mpra note 7, at 1208. It is to be noted that Chapter XII pro-
vides that a creditor may submit a counterplan to the debtor (§ 466). The cred-
itor's proposal must be approved by creditors holding 25 per cent. of the debts of a
class of creditors and io per cent, of all debts to be affected before it can be submitted
to the debtor. If the debtor accepts and the other requirements of the Act are met, the
plan becomes effective. This is probably what, as a practical matter, would ensue even
absent any such express provision, if a creditor suggests a feasible plan.
18. XI, § 323; XII, § 423. Insolvency is made a jurisdictional requirement by
these sections and must be averred in the debtor's petition.
19. XI, § 322; XII, § 422. These sections also specify the venue in the case of an
original petition to be in that court which would have jurisdiction of a bankruptcy peti-
tion for the debtor's adjudication. § 74 (a) had failed to specify the venue in such a
case.
20. § 74 (a). Brunn v. Wichser, 75 F. (2d) 25 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934).
21. § 12(a).
22. See supra note II.
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Chapter XI permits a debtor to file a petition thereunder after he is
adjudicated a bankrupt.2 38  Chapter XII, copying the old Section 74,24
provides that a petition may not be filed after adjudication.2 5 The reason
for this distinction is not apparent and its soundness is open to question.
It would seem that the "going concern" value of the debtor's business
would enable him to pay bigger dividends than if he were forced into
liquidation.
WHAT MAY BE DONE BY AN ARRANGEMENT
The Act of 1898 permitted a composition as to unsecured debts only.26
Failure to define expressly "composition" raised few, if any, administrative
difficulties. This was so because under Section 12 it was possible to offer
a certain consideration for the release of a claim; on acceptance by the
required number of creditors 2 7 and confirmation by the court 2 the debtor
was discharged from the balance.2 9  Thus the common-law definition of
composition, an offer to pay a certain percentage of a claim in return for
a full release, 0 was preserved. Under Section 74 (a) a plan for either
an extension or a composition could be filed; while certain distinctions
were attempted between these terms, they nowhere were actually defined.
However, Section 74 (h), providing that the terms of an extension pro-
posal could affect secured as well as unsecured debts, but silent as to a
composition, apparently meant that only an extension could affect secured
debts. This is further borne out by the fact that under Section 12 secured
debts could not be affected.-" However 74 (i) provided that confirmation
of a proposal should be binding, "Provided however, that such extension
or composition shall not reduce the amount or impair the lien of any
secured creditor, but shall affect only the time and method of liquidation."
This unfortunate choice of words led some writers 82 to believe that a
composition or an extension could affect the time and method of liquida-
tion of a secured creditor.8 3  Whatever confusion may have been caused
by the apparent overlapping of compositions and extensions has been
alleviated by the Chandler Act. For these vexatious terms the all-inclusive
"arrangement" is substituted. This term is defined in Chapter XI to
mean any "plan of a debtor for the settlement, satisfaction, or extension
23. § 321. Under § 12 terms of composition could be offered before or after ad-
judication. In re Moyer's Home Store, Inc., 26 F. (2d) 146, 147 (E. D. Pa. 1927).
24. § 74 (a).
25. § 421. It is interesting to note that Chapter X, which has replaced § 77B and
is restricted to corporations, also provides that a petition may be filed before or after
adjudication. See § 127.
26. §67 (d).
27. §12 (b).
28. § 12 (d).
29. § 14.
30. Continental Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. McGeoch, 92 Wis. 286, 66 N. W. 6D6
(1896) ; Rockville Nat'l Bank v. Holt, 58 Conn. 526, 20 Atl. 669 (189o). Note (1933)
ii N. Carolina L. REV. 310.
31. § 67 (d).
32. See Weinstein, Section 74: Compositions and Extensions (1933) 7 J. OF NAT'L
AsS'N OF REF. IN BKTCY. 240. See also Garrison, op. cit. supra note 5, at 292, 299, 300.
33. While this interpretation has been adopted by reputable authorities (supra note
32) it is submitted that it is obtained by a mere quibbling with words. While the sec-
tion is poorly drafted, the Congressional intent to exclude secured debts is shown by
the explanation of extension proposals in the four subsections preceding § 74 (i) and
the fact that they are expressly excluded from § 12, the composition section. If the
common-law definition of composition had been followed and extension had been inter-
preted literally, i. e., a proposal to extend the time of payment in full, much needless
confusion would have been eliminated.
LEGISLATION
of time for the payment of his unsecured debts upon any terms". 4 Sub-
stantially the same definition is used in Chapter XII except that it is there
provided that an arrangement shall affect secured debts 35 and may affect
unsecured debts. 36 This latter provision is designed merely to permit a
debtor to save time by including in the same proceeding both his secured
and unsecured debts. Consequently, an arrangement under Chapter XII
may contemplate either an extension or a composition as to both secured
and unsecured debts. This removes much confusion caused by the attempt
in the former Act to preserve a distinction between composition and ex-
tension proposals.
An important innovation in Chapter XII permits scaling down of
secured debts by means of an arrangement.37 Heretofore secured debts
could be affected only as to time of payment. They could not be reduced
in amount; 3s hence the necessity for "compositions" and "extensions".
Now the debtor may reduce his secured debts and thus modify or alter
rights of the lienholders. Although the constitutionality of thus affecting
secured claims has been questioned, 5 an analogous provision in 77B has
been upheld.40 The provision in Chapter XII is designed to aid those
debtors, excepting corporations, who own realty encumbered by a mort-
gage. By utilizing Chapter XII they may reduce the amount of their
secured indebtedness and retain their property. 1 Under the new plan
the social policy of rehabilitation is carried one step further. Perhaps this
result may be criticized on the ground that any plan which affects a
creditor's security will have the effect of impairing credit.42
One of the major difficulties under Section 74 in connection with
mortgage proposals seems but partially cured. It was there a prerequisite
that an extension proposal affecting both secured and unsecured claims be
accepted in writing by a majority in number and amount of such claims be-
fore it could become effective. 43 Since both secured and unsecured creditors
voted as one class,44 it was possible for one large unsecured creditor to con-
trol the whole proceedings.4 ' This defect, if it be so considered,46 has been
partially corrected by the provision that the debtor may deal with his cred-
34. § 306 (i).
35. §§406 (I), 461 (I).
36. § 461 (3).
37. §§4o6 (i), 461 (i).
38. § 74 (i). See Cotton v. Etheridge, 84 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936) ; In re
Iverson, 85 F. (2d) 159 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936). Cf. In re Mouton, 17 F. Supp. 81 (W.
D. La. 1936).
39. Note (I937) 46 YAE L. J. 1177, 1183 and n. 29 thereunder.
40. In re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 24 F. Supp. 5oi (S. D. Cal. 1938).
The authorities cited by this court indicate that the Circuit Courts of Appeals of the
2d, 4 th, 7th and 8th Circuits have held § 77B to be constitutional. The Supreme Court
has never directly passed upon the question.
41. This result was not attainable under Section 74, the extension provisions of which
were of little help to the average debtor.
42. Weinstein, op. cit. supra note 32, at I42. If a creditor felt that his security was
about to be reduced he would hesitate to lend money to anyone who he felt was either
in straitened circumstances or might be in the near future. On the other hand, the re-
sulting cautiousness in lenders might have the desirable prophylactic effect of reducing
the amount of over-mortgaged property, thereby preventing false credit. See WEIN-
STEIN, THE BANKRUPTCY LAW op 1938 (1938) 26o.
43. § 74 (e).
44. In re Sterba, 74 F. (2d) 413 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
45. WEiNSTEIN, loc. cd. supra note 42.
46. It must be admitted that this creditor has the most invested and stands to lose
the most, so perhaps it is only just that he control the proceedings.
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itors by classes and that the vote shall be by classes. 47  Thus a debtor may
possibly place a recalcitrant secured creditor in a special class. However,
adequate protection must be given this creditor either by payment of the
value of his debt in cash or by sale of the property affected by his lien,
the proceeds being transferred to him. 4 s  If the property is sold, the
debtor loses what is probably his biggest asset; and he will be unable to
pay cash or else he would not be trying to affect an arrangement. Where
the debtor is dealing with a recalcitrant unsecured creditor he is likewise
faced with a problem. If, for example, there are five mercantile creditors,
four of whom are willing to accept the plan, but the fifth is not and his
claim is sufficiently large to be a bar to the proceedings if he does not
accept, it would seem a violation of "due process" to arbitrarily place this
creditor in a class composed only of his claim unless it is provided that he
be paid in full. Such a provision might naturally react unfavorably on
the assenting creditors. Perhaps the court should be given the drastic
power of confirming a fair and equitable arrangement whether or not the
requisite number of creditors accept. 49 Such a power if wielded properly
would do much for rehabilitation and avoidance of straight bankruptcy.
The provision for dealing with the creditors by classes seems to be
entirely new to bankruptcy legislation. Previously all creditors were re-
quired to be dealt with on a parity,50 but under both chapters of the new
Act it is now provided that the arrangement may deal with the debts on a
parity or may divide the debts into classes and deal with the classes in
different ways or upon different terms.5 ' This is a useful provision; by
its use small claims may be paid in full 52 and thus eliminated while larger
claims may be classified according to their nature, i. e., mercantile claims,
loans, etc. Unfortunately no limits are set by the Act to aid in determin-
ing what types of classifications are permissible. As has been previously
suggested it would seem that certain arbitrary and unreasonable classifica-
tions, such as the division of the same types of creditors into different
classes, would be violative of the "due process" clause. It seems almost
certain that disputes concerning classifications will arise, causing delay and
47. XI, § 362; XII, § 468.
48. §461 (ii) states that the debtor must provide adequate protection for an
affected class of creditors which does not accept the arrangement by the required two-
thirds majority and enumerates the ways in which this protection may be given.
49. It was thought that under Section 74 the court had that power with reference to
an extension proposal, under the provision that if the debtor failed to obtain the accept-
ances of a majority of creditors he could submit a proposal which was to the best inter-
ests of all the creditors. § 74 (e). If this be read in connection with § 74 (g) it would
seem that the court could confirm the proposal if it were satisfied that (i) the plan was
equitable and feasible, (2) for the best interest of the creditors, (3) the debtor was not
guilty of any acts which would bar a discharge, and (4) that the offer and acceptance
are in good faith.
Then it would appear that the court could confirm the proposal over the "vociferous
objections of ioo%7 of the creditors" provided, in the court's opinion, the plan was feas-
ible and equitable. See Adams, Practice and Procedure Under Section 74 (1936) i J.
OF NAT'L Ass'N OF REF. IN BKTCY. 45; Note (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1177, 1181. But see
MOORE AND LEVi, GiLBERT'S COLLIER Ox BANKRUPTCY (4 th ed. 1937) 1335, intimating
that § 74 (e) is probably unconstitutional. However, this summary power of the court
never seems to have been successfully invoked. See, for example, In re Nordseth, 79
F. (2d) 645 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935) ; In re Entler, 97 F. (2d) 708 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938),
where there is an inference that had the requirements of § 74 (g) been met, the court
could have confirmed the proposal, even though a majority of the creditors did not
accept.
5o. Adams, loc. cit. supra note 49, at 46.
51. XI, § 357 (i) ; XII, § 461 (i).
52. This was part of the Congressional intent. See Analysis of H. R. x2889, 74th
Congress, 2d Sess. (1936) 42.
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expense. It is to be hoped that the courts will be liberal in their interpreta-
tion of this section of the Act and permit the debtor to divide his creditors
into classes as he may wish, absent of course any fraud or illegal intent to
prefer a favored creditor.
Under Chapter XI the arrangement may affect only those debts which
would be provable under the general terms of the Act.53 However, when
there is an extension of time for the payment of debts in full, debts are
defined to "include all unsecured debts, demands or claims of whatever
character against a debtor, whether or not provable as debts under Sec-
tion 63, and whether liquidated or unliquidated, fixed or contingent".
54
Apparently the reason for this distinction is that it is not desired to release
debts not provable under the general terms of the Act by payment of less
than the full amount. This distinction appears clearly here, but Chapter
XII may present a problem in construction. By Section 4o6 (2) it is
provided that "'Claims' shall include claims of every character against a
debtor or his property, secured or unsecured, liquidated or unliquidated,
fixed or contingent, and whether or not provable under Section 63 of the
Act."; by Section 4o6 (7) it is provided that "Debts shall include all
claims", so that in effect the definition supra is one of debts. If we read
this definition with Section 461 (3) which provides that an arrangement
may not only deal with secured debts but "May provide for treatment of
unsecured debts . . .", it would seem that under Chapter XII debts
which are not provable under the Act may still be settled for less than the
full amount. Thus we reach a result contrary to that obtained in Chapter
XI. This seems to afford a loophole-but only if the courts permit it-
for the debtors who have both secured and unsecured claims and so can
avail themselves of Chapter XII and effect a composition of debts not
provable under the general terms of the Act.
PRovIsIoNs FOR ACCEPTANCE BY THE CREDITORS AND CONFIRMATION BY
THE COURT
In order to speed up procedure two important new features have
been added by the Chandler Act. The first is that acceptances may be
obtained by the debtor before or after the filing of a petition."5 The
apparent purpose of this provision is to enable the debtor to sound out
his creditors on the arrangement proposal prior to the filing of his peti-
tion, and if he gets their acceptances in writing to use them without
having again to get acceptances after the filing of the petition.56 The new
53. § 63 enumerates provable debts.
54. § 307.
55. XI, § 336 (4) ; XII, § 436 (4).
56. Under Section 12 of the old Act it was impossible for the debtor to obtain ac-
ceptances before he was examined at the creditors' meeting. Examination was manda-
tory under § 12 (a). The purpose was to discover all assets and liabilities of the debtor
and to prevent fraud on his part. Under the Chandler Act the same end is reached by
requiring the debtor's petition to be accompanied by a schedule and a statement of affairs
and of the debtor's executory contracts. (§ 324.) It has been held under § 12 that if the
debtor made an offer of composition before examination there could be no confirmation
because the debtor did not act in good faith. Sheehan & Egan v. North Eastern Shoe
Co., 54 F. (2d) 5o (C. C. A. Ist, 1931) ; see In re Jablow, 15 F. (2d) 131, 132 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1926). For other examples of what the courts consider good faith see Platt v.
Schmidt, 87 F. (2d) 437 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937); In re Augustyn, 87 F. (2d) 577 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1937). Under Section 74 it was not mandatory that the debtor be examined at a
creditors' meeting before he could make an offer of an extension or a composition.
§ 74 (d) provided that "the debtor may be examined" at the first creditors' meeting.
(This provision has been criticized on the ground that examination should be mandatory.
See Weinstein, loc. cit. supra note 32, at 142.) But neither was there a provision for the
use of acceptances obtained prior to the filing of the petition.
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procedure will enable the debtor to save time in getting acceptances to his
proposal. In line with this time saving device the second new important
feature provides for an informal proceeding if there has been ioo per cent.
prior acceptance by the creditors. All that is then necessary is that the
debtor informally present the arrangement to the court and absent any
bad faith or fraud the court must confirm the proposal.5 7 At first this
seems to react both to the benefit of the creditors and the debtor, but upon
analysis it would seem that these provisions give the debtor a powerful
weapon. If any creditor refuses to accept the arrangement prior to the
filing of the petition, the debtor may either threaten to go into straight
bankruptcy or else to file proceedings anyway under Chapter XI or Chap-
ter XII and take a chance on securing the requisite number of acceptances
in the absence of ioo per cent. accord. The effect of this may be to bring
the common-law composition back into its own. The debtor may attempt
a common-law composition with his creditors; if they are reluctant to
accept his offer he may threaten to file proceedings under the Chandler
Act, using the acceptances he has already obtained. If he receives Ioo
per cent. acceptance to the plan then there would seem to be little use for
the Act since the plan will probably include a provision for discharge.58
This situation is not necessarily undesirable; if the debtor's plan is en-
tirely inequitable and unfeasible probably none of the creditors will accept
even in the face of a threat of proceedings under the Chandler Act; and if
9o per cent. in amount of the creditors are satisfied with the plan there
would seem to be no great harm in "bulldozing" the remaining IO per
cent. into accepting. It is also to be remembered that even if some cred-
itors do accept, the plan will not be approved by the court unless feasible.59
There are certain advantages to be derived from proceeding under the
Act. First, the debtor will be granted a judicial discharge which he would
not obtain by virtue of a common-law composition. Second, the plan
will be binding on dissenting creditors, which is not true in the case of a
common-law composition. Furthermore, if the debtor chooses to use a
statutory assignment there is considerable doubt notwithstanding the case
of Johnson v. Star 00 whether a release provision in the assignment is valid.
Thus it would seem likely that the average debtor would prefer to come
under the Act, provided he is assured that the proceedings will be speedy
and that he will not be subjected to protracted litigation due to ambiguities
in the various sections.
In the absence of ioo per cent. approval Chapter XI provides that a
debtor may submit an arrangement for confirmation by the court when
"it has been accepted in writing by a majority in number and amount of
all affected creditors of each class, whose claims have been approved and
allowed before the conclusion of the (creditor's) meeting"."' This section
is patterned after Sections 12 (b) and 74 (e) of the Act of 1898 as
amended and the only change is that permitting a vote by classes. 62 This
57. XI, § 361; XII, § 467.
58. See Mulder and Solomon, supra note 5, at 789, 791.
59. § 366, 467.
6o. 287 U. S. 527 (1933).
61. § 362 (1).
62. Therefore many of the cases under the old Act with reference to voting will
still be good law. See, for example, In re Messengill, HI3 Fed. 366 (E. D. N. C. 19o2)
holding that an assignee of claims of a number of creditors counts only as one creditor
in reference to voting; Miller's Apparel v. Siminoff, 29 F. (2d) 507 (C. C. A. ist,
I928), holding that in determining whether there is a majority, creditors whose claims
have not been filed until after a meeting to consider an offer of composition cannot be
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is, of course, simply an outcome of the new procedure which permits the
debts to be divided and dealt with by classes. 63  Chapter XII contains
much the same requirements except that it is there provided that the
arrangement must be accepted by two-thirds of the amount of the debts
of such class.6 4  It is interesting to note that Chapter X,6 5 providing for
corporate reorganization, contains the same two-thirds requirement as
Chapter XII. The reason for the distinction between these latter chapters
and Chapter XI is not easily seen. It may be that it was felt that in the
case of secured debts there was greater danger of the holder of one large
debt being overridden by the holders of numerous small debts than there
would be in the case of unsecured debts. However, unless this is factually
correct the provision seems to react unfavorably to the debtor. It will be
more difficult for him to secure the consent of two-thirds of his creditors
than it would be to secure the consent of a bare majority, and such effort
will be time-consuming.
Under both chapters the confirmation of an arrangement grants the
debtor a discharge from all debts provided for therein except as provided
in the arrangement that he shall not be discharged.6 6 Under Section 12
there had never been any doubt that the effect of a confirmation was a
discharge,67 but this was not true under Section 74. The problem there
arose in the case of a composition and it was thought that a strict inter-
pretation of the Act barred a discharge.63  Under the Chandler Act, each
Chapter expressly provides for a discharge upon confirmation by the
court.
69
One other procedural change may be here considered. Under Sec-
tion 12 a referee had only the limited powers of a special master.70 The
resultant shuttling back and forth of questions between referee and judge
consumed an unnecessary amount of time.71 This evil was attempted to
be corrected by Section 74 which provided for original jurisdiction to be
vested in the "Court" as distinguished from the "Judge". 72  Under Sec-
tion I (7) "Court" was defined to include referee 73 and thus he was given
considered. But such cases as Matter of Sterba, 74 F. (2d) 413 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935),
holding that both secured and unsecured creditors must vote as one class under § 74 (e)
are no longer good law.
63. XI, § 357 (1) ; XI, § 461 (i).
64. § 468. § 74 (e) had provided that an extension had to be accepted by a majority
in number and amount of the secured claims affected by the proposal.
65. § 179.
66. XI, § 371; XIl, § 476.
67. In re Kornbluth, 65 F. (2d) 400 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
68. This was worked out by the rather unique argument that since there were ex-
pressly reserved under Section 74 only certain bankruptcy privileges, -then Congress
must have intended not to confer any additional rights and privileges conferred under
the other sections of the Act. Therefore Congress must not have intended Section 14 (c)
governing discharges to apply to compositions affected under § 74. Weinstein, loc.
cit. supra note 32, at i44. But see Garrison, loc. cit. supra note 5, at 308. See also
Hanna, loc. cit. supra note 5, at 454, 455. However, the courts, unimpressed by such
reasoning, granted discharges upon confirmation of a composition. it re Greenman,
io F. Supp. 452 (S. D. Me. 1935); cf. it re Feifer, 22 F. Supp. 541 (S. D. N. Y.
1937), where a discharge in bankruptcy was refused because the debtor had affected a
composition under § 74 within six years preceding this action.
69. Supra note 66.
70. In re Youtie, 44 F. (2d) 56 (C. C. A. 3d, 93o) ; In re Lichtenstein, i Fed.
Supp. 383 (W. D. Pa. 932).
71. STURGES, CASES Ox DE0ToRs ESTATES (2d ed. 1937) 254-258.
72. § 74 (b) (c).
73. In re 'Weissbaum, 2 F. Supp. 967, 968 (N. D. Cal. 1933). This proviso would
eliminate problems such as those in In re J. B. Pollak Co., 86 F, (2d) 99 (C. C. A. 2d,
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original jurisdiction. It was hoped that this would speed up the proceed-
ings, but unfortunately much use does not seem to have been made of
this provision.7 4  The Chandler Act retains this definition of "Court" 7
and both Chapter XI and XII provide for original jurisdiction to be
vested in the court. Thus enlarging the judicial powers of a referee
should expedite the proceeding, 76 especially in view of the fact that a
referee is a specialist in bankruptcy matters.
If for any reason the arrangement fails of confirmation, the debtor
may be adjudged a bankrupt.7 7  If the arrangement petition was filed in
a pending bankruptcy proceeding, the reinstituted bankruptcy proceeding
is a mere continuation of the one previously initiated, and dates from the
time the original bankruptcy petition was filed.7 8  Thus fraudulent trans-
fers and preferences, voidable as of that date, remain voidable.79 The
"statutes of limitations" are tolled during the period of the attempted
arrangement. This was not true under the former Act.80
CONCLUSION
It may safely be assumed that the Chandler Act will meet with a
warmer reception than the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The new Act evi-
dences careful draftsmanship and forethought. However, as has been
pointed out there are portions of the chapters devoted to a debtor's petition
for relief that are vague and ambiguous. Resultant litigation means only
delay. If this proves too burdensome, new life may be given to common-
law compositions and general assignments. Such a result would be un-
fortunate; there are numerous portions of Chapters XI and XII that will
give the debtor a greater advantage than if he attempts to act outside the
bankruptcy legislation. For example, the provisions that the debtor may
divide his creditors into classes, that secured debts may be decreased, that
acceptances obtained prior to the filing of the petition may be used, all
react to the debtor's benefit and help him to obtain speedy relief at a
minimum of cost. Combined with these features is the fact that if the
debtor succeeds in effecting an arrangement under the Act he will be given
a judicial release. It is desirable that all ambiguities be speedily clarified,
whether by litigation or legislative amendment, in order that the arrange-
ment chapters may achieve their purpose.
W. E. K., Jr.
1936), where it was held that the referee had no power to allow the claim of any cred-
itor for the purpose of establishing his right to share in a composition fund under § 12.
74. For example, see lit re Bowman, 24 F. Supp. 381, 383 (S. D. Cal. 1938). Here
proceedings under § 74 were instituted on May 23, 1935, and shuttled back and forth
between the referee and the District Judge until the middle of 1937 when the debtor's
petition was finally denied by the Judge.
75. § i (9).
76. XI, § 331 ; XII, § 431.
77. If the arrangement petition was original, the court may either adjudge the
debtor a bankrupt or may dismiss the proceedings "as in the court's opinion may be in
the interest of the creditors". XI, § 376; XII, § 482 (2). Under § 74 the court could
for enumerated reasons "adjudicate the debtor a bankrupt". § 74 (1).
If the arrangement petition is filed in a pending bankruptcy proceeding, the court
must dismiss the arrangement petition and direct that the bankruptcy petition pro-
ceed. §§376 (I), 481 (i).
78. XI, § 378; XII, §483 (i).
79. See WEINSTEIN, THE BANKRUPTCY LAW oF 1938 (1938) 243, 248, 249, 321.
8o. Garrison, loc. cit. supra note 5, at 310; see In re Adamson, 83 F. (2d) 211 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1937) ; cf. Conden Corp. v. Williams, 93 F. (2d) 758 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
For the effect on creditors filing claims within six months of the adjudication, but six
months after the filing of the petition, see § 57 (n).
